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We are grateful to Kalipso Chalkidou, Peter Littlejohns, Benedict Rumbold, Addis Tamire 
Woldemariam, Albert Weale, and James Wilson for engaging so thoroughly and insightfully 
with Making fair choices on the path to universal health coverage (WHO, 2014). We 
welcome the agreement among us on many issues. Here, we shall principally address issues 
on which they question the Report’s values or judgments. Section 1 discusses equity and 
political economy. Section 2 addresses the significance of the starting point for progress 
towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Section 3 clarifies and defends the Report’s claim 
that particular trade-offs are unacceptable. Section 4 addresses the need for more 
information on “what works.” 
  
1. Equity and political economy 
 
Tamire Woldemariam (p. ) claims that the Report’s conception of fairness in service 
provision unduly prioritizes “horizontal equity” (providing the same quality services to 
everyone with the same need) over “vertical equity” (which he understands as the provision 
of care suited to differential needs, e.g. antimalarials for a malaria sufferer and cardiac 
surgery for a heart condition).  
 
In reply: the Report differs from Tamire Woldemariam’s interpretation of vertical equity in 
the use of health care resources, on which both the malaria sufferer and the person with an 
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operable heart condition must be treated. Instead, the Report follows Morris et al. (2005, p. 
1251) in understanding vertical equity in health service provision as demanding that 
“individuals with different levels of need consume appropriately different amounts of health 
care.” The question is then what level of health care is appropriate for different needs. The 
Report denies that under circumstances of severe resource scarcity, it is always appropriate 
to treat both the malaria sufferer and the person with an operable heart condition. Instead, 
it  holds that coverage should be based on (among other factors) both the health gain per 
unit of expenditure and the level of advantage from which this gain takes place, with greater 
importance being assigned to gains that come to the worst off. On these grounds, the 
Report holds, it may be fair to offer coverage for malaria whilst failing to offer coverage for 
a heart condition, if treatment for the heart condition (a) is much less cost-effective than 
other as-yet-uncovered treatments; and (b) benefits people who are typically among the 
better off (say, because they are already long-lived and are among a relatively well-off urban 
class).  
 
Tamire Woldemariam (p. ) also suggests that the Report add to the criteria proposed for 
deciding on coverage a criterion of “achieving high total return.” Since the Report’s three 
core criteria already aim at gains in aggregate health, improvements in the situation of the 
worst off, and a reduction in health-related poverty, we assume that he has in mind still 
broader effects, such as improved economic growth or strengthening the social fabric (e.g. 
by engaging a broad segment of society, as in the recruitment of health-promotion 
volunteers in Ethiopia to which he refers). These broader effects are certainly among the 
permissible aims of government policy. It is, however, a deeply controversial issue how far, 
if at all, such additional benefits should count in priority setting within the health sector 
(Brock, 2003). The Report therefore merely raises them as factors that are worth 
considering (see Box 3.3). 
 
Littlejohns and Chalkidou (p. ) worry that the Report’s frequent use of the word “should” 
“makes it seem all too easy” to implement its recommendations. Apart from its recognition 
of resource constraints, they suggest, the Report is blind to the political constraints faced by 
decision-makers.  
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Their challenge offers an opportunity to clarify the Report’s intended role. In ordinary 
discourse, sometimes “should” implies “can.” For example, if your doctor says, “you should 
walk more,” she must assume that you can walk more. Nonetheless, “should” may also be 
used in an explanation of what it would take for policies to conform to a standard, without 
implying that meeting this standard is currently feasible for the policy-maker in question. 
This is the way it is used in the Report. Take, for example, its claim that “the health system 
should first expand coverage for [services] in the highest priority class” (p. 22). Suppose that 
a policy-maker aims to move towards UHC in circumstances in which many rural poor still 
lack access to skilled birth attendance. Assume also that in order to somewhat improve their 
access to very cost-effective skilled birth attendance at a later point in time, this policy-
maker must first secure the support of an urban elite, which demands an expansion of 
coverage for only moderately cost-effective tertiary care in the cities. By compelling the 
policy-maker to devote resources to an expansion of coverage for low-priority services 
which she could otherwise have used to expand a high-priority service, this interest group 
forces her to depart from a fair path to UHC. There is then a distance between what should, 
in fairness, be done first and what a pragmatic policy-maker will have to do. We agree with 
Tamire Woldemariam (p. ) that in such circumstances it may be necessary to make “wise 
choices” that are not wholly fair. Nevertheless, it is important that the resulting unfairness is 
recognised and minimized. Therefore, even when the fairest path is rendered unfeasible by 
political constraints, the Report’s recommendations can play a twofold role. First, to 
evaluate the policies demanded by the interest group against a standard of fairness. Second, 
to help a policy-maker select the least unfair among the policies that remain feasible once 
the constraints imposed by this interest group have been taken into account. The Report 
therefore does not assume away political constraints. Rather, it aims to offer a critical 
perspective on their effect and to guide choice given their operation. 
 
Weale (p. ) raises a question about the Report’s recommendation that countries “include 
disadvantaged groups from the outset and make sure that these groups are not left behind” 
(p. 38). He notes that this recommendation is sensible only if a good way to improve the lot 
of the worst off in the long run is to choose policies that benefit them at each stage on the 
path to UHC. But, he argues, though this empirical assumption may be true, it also might be 
false. For example, it might be necessary to develop competence in running an insurance 
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scheme by starting it among formal sector workers. Or the most likely route to UHC might 
be to first expand coverage for well-off groups, in the expectation that this will eventually 
generate a demand for an expanding circle of coverage.  
 
We believe that, at every step on the way to UHC, policy-makers should give particular 
weight to the interests of the worst off. However, we acknowledge (as does the Report, p. 
37ni) that if it were established that attempting to include the worst off from the start 
would severely impede progress towards UHC, then those especially concerned with the 
worst off should accept policies that, temporarily, leave them behind.1 The Report’s 
recommendation should therefore be taken to apply only when including the worst off from 
the start is an effective way of improving their lot in the long run.   
 
2. Starting points and rankings 
 
Littlejohns and Chalkidou (p. ) and Weale (p. ) point out that, while the Report focuses on 
expansion of coverage, its criteria have implications for disinvestment as well. For example, 
the criteria might require dropping coverage for some low priority services (e.g. dialysis) in 
order to expand coverage for high priority services (e.g. secondary prevention of diabetes 
and cardiovascular disease). Disinvestment is, of course, politically difficult (as one 
government official remarked to some authors of the Report: “Don’t take sugarcane from 
the elephant’s mouth!”). Moreover, as Weale (p.) argues, there may be moral reasons that 
distinguish disinvestment from expansion. For example, people who have paid in to receive 
a particular package of coverage may have a claim to that coverage. The Report does not 
discuss how to balance such claims against the claims of others to high-priority treatments, 
but we agree that guidance on this difficult issue is required.  
 
Weale (p. ) also questions the Report’s proposed assignment of available interventions into 
priority tiers, partly on the grounds that it is too demanding on limited cognitive resources. 
In reply, we agree that well-informed complete ranking of all possible interventions is 
unfeasible. But the criteria recommended by the Report can provide useful guidance 
                                                     
1
 Rawls (1999, p. 217-218) also notes that when this is necessary for progress towards a just society it is 
permissible to pursue policies that initially favour only the better off. 
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without such a ranking. Consider two common types of situation. In a first type, the decision 
maker is considering only a single intervention and lacks information about exactly which 
intervention(s) will lose out if the intervention in question is funded. In these cases, she can 
gather estimates of the proposed new intervention’s (i) cost-effectiveness; (ii) impacts on 
disadvantaged groups; and (iii) effects on the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure 
and apply a set of thresholds (in the manner illustrated in Box 1 of our Précis), with the 
thresholds determined by an estimate of the opportunity costs of funding that intervention 
(Claxton et al. 2013). If the intervention falls into the high-priority class, then that is a good 
reason to fund it. If the intervention falls in the low-priority class, then she has a good 
reason not to fund it, as it is likely the resources are better used on other interventions, 
especially in a setting where many high-priority interventions are yet to be fully covered.  
 
In a second type of decision scenario, the decision maker has to choose one intervention 
among a limited set of interventions competing for the same resources. If she can gather 
decent estimates of how these interventions score on the three core criteria, then she can 
attempt to rank them and fund the intervention that is highest ranked. By way of 
illustration, consider a simplified version of a choice faced by administrators during the 
expansion of the Thai Universal Coverage System (UCS) in the mid-2000s.2 The question was 
whether to (i) first expand coverage for secondary prevention for diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease; or instead (ii) first offer coverage for dialysis. Making this decision 
did not require a ranking of all available interventions in the health system—just of these 
two interventions (prevention was ‘on the menu’ because it was known to typically be cost-
effective; dialysis due to advocacy on behalf of patient groups and nephrologists). Table 1 
gives estimates for how these interventions performed on the Report’s three key criteria. In 
brief, secondary prevention had an overwhelming advantage in terms of cost-effectiveness, 
but dialysis helped those who were worse off on one important indicator, namely their 
individual disease burden. Moreover, considerations of financial risk protection did not 
clearly favour one of the two policies. Coverage for dialysis offered a clear reduction in 
catastrophic health expenditure for an identified group of sufferers. However, secondary 
preventive services would, eventually, prevent many serious cases of illness, thereby also 
                                                     
2
 We are grateful to Nir Eyal, Phusit Prakongsai, and Angkana Sommanustweechai for discussion of the real-
world choices on which this case is based. 
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preventing some cases of catastrophic expenditure and income loss. It was therefore 
plausible that, in the long run, secondary preventive services would, on balance, offer more 
financial risk protection than dialysis.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The Report recognizes that there is room for reasonable disagreement about such cases. It 
requires only that the three core values of cost-effectiveness, priority to the worst off, and 
financial risk protection should be considered, but prescribes no single way of balancing 
them (p. 20). Moreover, these criteria are not exhaustive—other considerations will be 
morally relevant. In the Thai context, for example, it was significant that two other public 
insurance schemes (those for civil servants and formal sector workers) already covered 
dialysis, so that the lack of coverage in the UCS became, to some, a symbol of second-class 
treatment of those in the informal sector (WHO 2010). Nonetheless, the Report suggests a 
way of combining criteria that would yield a clear judgment in this case (pp. 20-22; see also 
Box 1 in our Précis). Roughly, it proposes that highly cost-effective interventions should 
definitely have high priority and very cost-ineffective interventions should definitely have 
low priority, and that other criteria may determine the priority class of the intervention only 
in the (substantial) range in between these extremes. Now, the estimated range of cost-
effectiveness of secondary prevention arguably places it within the high priority category, 
whereas the estimated range of cost-effectiveness for dialysis places it firmly within the low 
priority category. The Report’s suggested judgment is therefore that secondary prevention 
should be prioritized over dialysis. 
  
3. Unacceptable trade-offs 
 
The Report allows for many different ways of making trade-offs on the path to UHC. But it 
also argues that particular ways of making trade-offs are generally unacceptable. Several 
respondents question this claim.  
 
Littlejohns and Chalkidou (p. ) ask “to whom and why” these trade-offs are said to be 
unacceptable. We take this question to be about the Report’s moral universalism. When the 
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Report claims that particular ways of making trade-offs are generally unacceptable, it claims 
that they are generally incompatible with what the large and diverse group of authors 
collectively agreed were reasonable ways of weighing the three core values, and therefore 
presumptively unjustifiable to those affected by or concerned with the decision, though it is 
allowed that other moral factors may give grounds for overriding this presumption. But, one 
might ask, what justifies taking the promotion of aggregate health, improving the condition 
of those worst off, and financial risk protection as values which should guide policy in all 
countries on the path to UHC and which should each have substantial independent weight 
in their policy decisions? In reply: these three aims have support from a multitude of moral 
perspectives; they are also widely endorsed as proper goals for health systems. Moreover, 
they play a central role in motivating the pursuit of UHC. In endorsing UHC as a goal (as in 
the 2005 58th World Health Assembly), the member states of the WHO therefore expressed 
support for these values. It is thus fitting that the Report clarifies these values and provides 
advice on how they should guide policy-makers on the path to UHC. 
 
Rumbold and Wilson discern a conflict between the Report’s tolerance for various ways of 
making trade-offs and its argument that particular trade-offs are nonetheless unacceptable. 
Before we remark on the detail of their argument, we note that the Report’s general 
strategy here is straightforward: the unacceptable trade-offs mark out a “no go area;” the 
Report is tolerant about where one goes within the remaining area. However, Rumbold and 
Wilson question the way these boundaries are drawn. One of their arguments concerns the 
second unacceptable trade-off (UT2): “to give high priority to very costly services whose 
coverage will provide substantial financial protection when the health benefits are very 
small compared to alternative, less costly services” (p. 39 in the Report). Rumbold and 
Wilson understand UT2 as implying that “in almost all cases cost-effectiveness should trump 
financial risk protection” (p. ). In their view, it therefore contradicts what they take to be the 
Report’s “attempts to stay neutral as to how the values of cost-effectiveness, benefit to the 
worse off and financial protection ought to be weighed against one another” (p. ).   
 
We acknowledge that the wording of UT2 can suggest Rumbold and Wilson’s interpretation. 
We therefore welcome the chance to explain how regarding this trade-off as generally 
unacceptable is consistent with the Report’s aforementioned ecumenical attitude. The 
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justification offered in the Report for UT2 is that prioritizing coverage for very cost-
ineffective interventions that offer substantial financial risk protection over very cost-
effective interventions is presumptively unjustifiable because coverage for the latter 
typically dominates the former both in terms of health gains and in terms of financial risk 
protection. As the Report states (p. 39), favouring costly services that offer low health gains:  
“(...) is also unfortunate from the perspective of financial risk protection because 
health benefits tend to provide such protection indirectly. Health improvements can 
prevent certain out-of-pocket payments downstream and can increase productivity 
and the income-earning potential in the beneficiaries and their families. [E]ven 
immediate financial risk protection can often be secured more cheaply and fairly 
than through coverage of very costly services with limited health benefits. One 
reason is that even small out-of-pocket payments for non-costly services can be a 
significant financial burden on the poor, and [by favouring cost-effective services] 
more of these services can be covered within a fixed budget.” 
There is therefore no conflict between UT2 and the Report’s tolerance for a variety of ways 
of trading off financial risk protection against health gains. As a further clarification, we also 
note that the Report’s tolerance does not equate with an attempt to “stay neutral” on how 
these values should be traded off. Rather, as our discussion of the case of dialysis versus 
secondary prevention shows, the Report proposes (though it does not prescribe) an 
approach to weighing them. Like many an opinionated liberal, the Report is therefore both 
partisan and tolerant. 
 
Rumbold and Wilson also challenge UT1: “to expand coverage for low- or medium-priority 
services before there is near universal coverage for high-priority services” (p. 38 in the 
Report). This, they write, proscribes some perfectly reasonable choices: “[Contra UT1,] it 
does not seem to be unacceptable for a policy-maker to seek to remove, say cultural or 
ethnic barriers to health care for all [existing low, medium and high-priority] services, before 
seeking to ensure maximal coverage for [high priority] ones” (p. ) In reply: we agree that 
overcoming barriers posed by stigmatization or discrimination offers grounds for prioritizing 
effective and affordable access for a currently excluded group to already provided services. 
Ensuring such access may be an important step towards ensuring its members’ rights are 
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met; it may also affirm their status as citizens. Cases such as this show why expanding low 
priority services before high priority services is only presumptively unacceptable.  
 
Finally, Rumbold and Wilson (p. ) discern a conflict between UT1 and UT3 (“to expand 
coverage for well-off groups before doing so for worse-off groups when the costs and 
benefits are not vastly different”; p. 39 in the Report). They ask: “What ought a policy-maker 
to do when faced with the question of whether to expand coverage for low- and medium-
priority services for the worse-off or expand coverage for high-priority services for the 
already well-off? Both options here, on different UTs, look generally unacceptable” (p. )  
 
The following may be an example of what they have in mind. Let us revise our “dialysis 
versus secondary prevention” case as follows. Suppose the decision-maker must choose 
between (i) adding high-priority secondary prevention to the already more generous 
packages for the formal sector or, instead (ii) adding the low-priority dialysis to the more 
limited UCS (for the informal sector). Option (ii) appears to be ruled out by the prohibition 
on expanding coverage for low-priority services before high-priority services (UT1). But (i) is 
ruled out by the prohibition on expanding coverage for the better off before expanding 
coverage for the worse off (UT3)—or so Rumbold and Wilson seem to think.  
 
In reply: this is not really a conflict between two of the Report’s “thou shalt not’s.” UT3 only 
proscribes expanding coverage for the better-off rather than the worse off when the costs 
and benefits are not vastly different. But, of course, in this case, they are vastly different—it 
is precisely because they are so different that secondary prevention is a high priority service 
and dialysis a low priority service. So, contrary to Rumbold and Wilson, UT3 is mute in cases 
of this kind. Nonetheless, the example could be seen as a challenge to UT1. After all, the 
example involves a trade-off in which various answers may be reasonable. We therefore 
conclude that Rumbold and Wilson’s discussion suggests a second case in which UT1’s 
presumption favouring an expansion of high priority services may be overridden. 
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4. The need for more information 
 
We end on a topic of agreement. Littlejohns and Chalkidou argue that successful 
implementation will depend on more data, especially on what works (and what fails) in 
practice. We welcome their many constructive suggestions for future research and share 
their belief that developing a catalogue of implementation case studies should be a priority 
and that it would be especially valuable to see whether these studies confirm or challenge 
the general approach advocated in the Report. Fortunately, the WHO agrees. Under the 
leadership of Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer it has gathered nearly two dozen academics and 
policy-makers from low and middle-income countries to draft ten implementation case 
studies. These studies examine stylized versions of actual decisions taken on the route 
towards UHC and assess them in the light of the Report’s recommendations, and vice versa. 
(The WHO plans to make them available on the WHO-CHOICE website.) 
 
In closing: Weale (p. ) rightly remarks that understanding the circumstances in which UHC is 
pursued and knowing how to act effectively in these circumstances are prerequisites for 
progress. We thank our critics for their contributions to this understanding and know-how. 
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Table 1 Relevant data for dialysis and secondary prevention 
 Cost-effectiveness 
3
 
(multiples of GDP per 
capita per QALY) 
Situation of the worst 
off
4
 (average life years 
lost without 
intervention for patients 
for whom the condition 
would be fatal) 
Financial risk 
protection
5
 (cases of 
catastrophic 
expenditure averted) 
Dialysis 
 
6.7-8 35 21,000 
Secondary prevention 
of diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease 
0.15-1.3 20 No precise estimates 
available, but likely to 
be substantial. 
 
 
                                                     
3
 Teerawattanon et al (2007) and DCP2 http://dcp2.org/interventions/17/interventions-for-diabetes (accessed 
June 2014), using per capita income of USD 3,000. 
4
 Authors’ own calculation from GBD Database (spreadsheet available upon request). These numbers are 
relative to the GBD global norm of 86 years. 
5
 This is based on an estimate by Phusit Prakongsai, assuming 31,000 cases annually, 75% of which fall under 
informal sector health insurance with 90% of these cases facing catastrophic health expenditure (>10% of 
monthly consumption expenditure) if not covered. See also Prakongsai et al. (2009).  
